

Summary and Analysis of key findings and monitoring reports.

Monitors were deployed for monitoring beginning February 14. As at June 30, a total of 424 incidents were reported with 655 persons killed and 211 persons wounded. Although this figure may represent a much lower death record than the reported over 800 persons killed in the post-presidential violence in 12 northern states, our figures are authentic data based on areas covered and captured across the whole country. There was also the destruction of property. The perpetrators of the violence were mostly party actors with all the major parties involved. Most of the deaths in the North East and North West were as a result of the post-presidential election violence which engulfed all the states of these zones.

Although NEVR monitors reported a marked improvement in the conduct and credibility of the April 2011 elections when compared to previous elections, there were glaring lapses. Specifically, credit must be given to INEC for introducing new guidelines and rules including the banning of movement of all persons, no matter how highly-placed, between polling units or towns and villages. The non-restriction of political office holders during previous elections is known to have been responsible for electoral fraud like illegal movement of electoral materials especially by incumbent office holders to the detriment of the opposition. Similarly, the insistence by INEC for the posting of results at polling units also contributed to making it difficult habitual riggers to attempt falsifying figures between polling units and collation centers.

It must, however, be observed that there were many malpractices noticed and reported by our monitors. One of such was the issue of under aged voters, mostly in the Northern parts of the country. Most disturbingly was the use of

those under aged voters to perpetrate violence in the post-election violence. We also received complaints and secondary reports that voter turn-out was manipulated and especially inflated in many states, especially in some southern states as alleged by the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) led by General Muhammadu Buhari.. Although we could not verify this allegation, but since it is an electoral offence that could compromise the outcome of elections, it is a very serious allegation that needs to be investigated. There was also a systematic muzzling of dissent. Politicians incite their supporters by giving out false information.

Summary of report in Diagrams and charts:

Table 1: Reported violence incidents by month-

<i>Month</i>	<i>No of incidents</i>
<i>February</i>	<i>75</i>
<i>March</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>April</i>	<i>165</i>
<i>May</i>	<i>72</i>
<i>June</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>424</i>




Diagram 1: no of incidents by months

Overall 337 incidents were reported between February and April 2011. The highest number of incidents was in April which had almost half of the number of incidents. This is understandable since April was the election month and given the spate of post-election violence in twelve states of the north

Table 2: Incidents by Zone

Month	Zone						Total
	NE	NW	NC	SE	SS	SW	
February	7	10	6	8	9	35	75
March	23	10	7	10	13	34	97
April	47	44	33	13	14	14	165
May	5	42	2	-	14	5	68
June	11	-	-	-	4	4	19
Total	93	106	48	31	54	92	424




Figure 2: Number of incidents reported by zones

SW (with a total of 83 incidents) NE (with a total of 77 incidents), and NC (with a total 64 incidents) have the highest number of incidents of violence. The SW had most of its incidents before the election in April. The reduction in the number of incidents is attributed to the impact of the efforts of organizations to ensure a violence-free election. Most of the reported incidents in the NE and NW were in April. This is because the post-election violence was more intense in Bauchi and Kaduna states in the NE and NW, respectively. The low number of incidents in the NC, SS and SE may have been due to low reporting rather than low occurrence of violence.

Table 3: Number of persons killed by Month

Month	No of people killed
February	42
March	25
April	509
May	28
June	61
Total	655




Figure 3: Number of persons killed by months

April has the highest number of person killed. This is because of the post-election violence which was the worst witnessed in this democratic dispensation. The trend in the previous elections had been that most violence was during elections.

Table 4: Number of Persons killed by Zone

Month	Zone						Total
	NE	NW	NC	SE	SS	SW	
February	-	2	-	-	12	18	32
March	10	2	-	4	6	3	25
April	61	420	8	2	11	7	509
May	17	6	2	-	2	1	28
June	61	-	-	-	-	-	61
Total	149	430	10	6	31	29	655




Figure 4: Number of persons killed by zone

The NW and the NE recorded the highest number of persons killed because of the post-election violence that rocked the zones and the spate of bomb blasts in those zones, particularly in the NE.

- **Trends and forms of election day and post election violence in the April 2011 elections-**

Although violence was recorded in more than half of the states across the country in all the elections, but the highest incidences were recorded in Kaduna, Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, Benue, Kano, Niger, Akwa-IbOm, Bayelsa, Delta, Imo and Anambra states. These violence incidents were consistent with our pre-election predictions based on the Situation analysis undertaken in December 2010. These incidents were recorded mainly in the governorship, National Assembly and State Assembly elections. The incidents included cases of political thuggery, politically-motivated assassinations, intimidation of opponents and outright rigging.

Yet, the most devastating violence was the one that followed the Presidential election. It took place in twelve northern states of Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Katsina,

Nassarawa, Zamfara and Sokoto states. It's spontaneous and seemingly pre-meditated. The fact that most of the violence took place in the political stronghold of the main opposition candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari of the CPC who had been accused of using language of threat, further pointed accusing fingers at his party. Earlier, during the tallying of votes when General Buhari seemed to doing well, his supporters were jubilating. As soon as President Jonathan of the ruling party, PDP secured an unassailable lead, the violence, blamed mainly on the CPC, erupted, ironically from states where CPC won. These states were Bauchi (where he secured more than 80% of the votes), Borno, Kaduna, Niger and Katsina. The violence was characterized by arson, killing of religious leaders, youth corpsers and perceived non-indigenes, destruction and burning of cars, police stations, places of worship, etc. The location and intensity of the violence informed the suggestion that it was violence associated with the rancorous and bitter debate on the PDP zoning arrangement in which many northern elites insisted that President Jonathan should not contest. The details of the casualties and losses incurred during the violence have been reflected in this report, wherein hundreds of persons lost their lives. In Kaduna state, the violence started in Zaria, and later spread as reprisal killings and intense violence in the southern part of the state. The violence in Kaduna acquired an ethno-religious dimension, and it recorded more than 400 losses of human lives. The violence in Bauchi state was targeted at not only PDP followers, but non-indigenes and NYSC members who were said to have been targeted because they resisted under-age, proxy and multiple voting. In Borno state, the violence was partly attributed to the feud between the then Governor of Borno state and the extremist group, *Boko Haram* .

- ***Verdict of election observers and monitors-***
 - Both local and international observers and monitors adjudged the 2011 elections as being more credible than any recent elections conducted by INEC

- As if to give credence to the above conclusion, statistics have estimated 80% drop in the post-2011 election litigations when compared with the 2007 elections

- ***Performance of INEC:***

- (i) Commendable actions and innovations-

- Early arrival/sufficiency of materials
 - Timely reporting of INEC and ad-hoc staff to Polling units
 - Prompt reposting, redeployment or reshuffling of INEC staff and Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) whenever there were complaints
 - The resort to the use of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members as ad-hoc staff instead of partisan civil servants and politicians as was the case in previous elections, thereby eliciting confidence in the process by voters
 - The banning of all persons, no matter how highly placed, from moving between polling units, towns, and villages with their retinue of aids and staff
 - The mandatory display of results at all polling units before departure of polling staff and agents leave

- (ii) ***Observed lapses-***

- Missing names on the voter register
 - Massive underage, multiple and proxy voting
 - Questionable high voter turn-out in especially high-state elections
 - No uniform procedure in voting protocol at polling units
 - Polling units not sufficiently secured with presence of security personnel

- Secrecy of the ballot violated with impunity as a result of unorganized queuing arrangements and sometimes stampede at the voting point in polling stations
- Financial inducements were observed in many places
- Absence of enforcement of code of conduct by political parties

- ***The NEVR project visibility parameters: Website, Newsletter, press conference, and press statements at national and zonal levels***

To ensure the message of non-violence was propagated, we registered a website (displayed later), produced bi-monthly Newsletters and also issued periodic press releases and statements at national, zonal and state levels. This is thought to have made it possible for the public to know about our objectives and activities aimed at promoting non-violent elections. We also undertook newspaper tracking (attached as appendix) to complement the reports sent by our monitors.

Observations and Recommendations:

Observations

- i. The identity issue in Nigerian politics played out openly again. This factor may explain why most Nigerians believe a person from their own tribe must be in power, to appropriate for them benefits and as a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups from taking resources, privileges, jobs, land and other entitlements. International experience has shown that in situations where ethnic or religious groups distrust each other and are afraid of being excluded from governance or being victimized, this fear might drive them to resort to violence first in a preemptive

move to minimize damage .The debate on zoning which threatened the very existence of the country must be seen in this light. There must be concerted efforts by all to enthrone constitutionalism and inclusivity in the polity.

- ii. The electoral system in use in Nigeria encourages a disproportionality of results. Disproportionality is defined as the difference between the vote share of a party and its seat share. In a plural society like ours, this over-representation of a large party and the under-representation of smaller parties could contribute to dangerous frustrations among ethnic and political minorities, especially, when the party fails to cut across social differences. Moreover, the winner-takes-all outcome of this system has made politics a do-or-die affair with the politician using any means (including violence) to gain political power.
- iii. Election Violence is hardly random or spontaneous. In most cases, leaders of political parties premeditate protesting election results, often in response to perceived or actual electoral malfeasance that other parties or an election management body perpetrates. Some bogus accusations by different political parties just before the elections that other parties were planning to rig the elections or that ballot boxes were already being stuffed in readiness for rigging elections or that they had been rigged out in the previous elections etc. were meant to incite the public against any result that might not favor them.
- iv. There seems to be a pattern of impunity for violence. Perpetrators of electoral violence almost always escape serious investigation or prosecution, or are usually released very soon after their arrest.

- v. There were several instances of under aged voting, particularly in the northern states. Particularly disturbing is the use of these children by some unscrupulous politicians to perpetrate violence.
- vi. The excessive constitutional powers of the executive arm of government is said to circumvent transparency and checks and balances, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the executive, or political supporters of the incumbent regime, are held accountable for political violence.

Other observations-

- The commendable role of civil society organizations
- The absence of electoral offences tribunal (largely blamed on the 6th National assembly) as incentives for electoral violence
- The violent actions and impunity of some political parties and candidates
- Prebendalism, questionable political party financing and corruption were identified as root causes of flawed elections
- Terror financing and activism
- *Boko Haram* and political thugs as the ugly face of politically motivated violence
- Brazen corruption, arrogance of power and abuse of state resources in governance and elections as fertile grounds for violence
- The paradox of violence in a credible election
- ***Implementation/financial challenges-***

Due to the difficulties of coordination in umbrella organizations, there were challenges of compiling reports from the six hub organizations in the six geopolitical zones of the country.

- ***Recommendations towards improved future elections in Nigeria:***
 - i. There must be concerted efforts by all to enthrone constitutionalism in the polity. The civil society must establish a broad based coalition of organizations to promote constitutionalism in Nigeria.
 - ii. The issue of **Political Party Registration and Regulatory Commission** as recommended by Electoral Reforms Committee should be a priority on the list of items to be addressed in the ongoing constitutional and electoral act amendments. When it comes into effect, the commission should be given the powers to impose a reasonable, effective and credible sanctions regime. Similarly, it is recommended that the establishment of **Electoral Offences Tribunal** this should include specific electoral penalties, such as disqualification of a candidate or a party, prohibition to hold public office for a specified period etc.
 - iii. Nigeria should begin to revise its winner-takes-all electoral system, and adopt more inclusive electoral systems that take into account identity diversities of the country. The electoral system thus adopted, should aim at achieving the objectives of proportionality of seats to votes; accountability to constituents; durable governments; ethnic, religious and racial conciliation; and minority office-holding. The recommendation by the Electoral Reform Committee that a mixed system where proportional representation is used alongside the first-pass-the post system should be reconsidered
 - iv. Nigeria also needs to embark on a grand project to address the problems of identity divisions, which have permeated its electoral politics. While

there is the need to adopt all inclusive political systems that take into account its ethnic and religious diversity, political parties must be guided by codes of conduct that will prevent them from creating divisive identity sentiments during elections.

- v. In view of some of the experiences during the elections where there were glaring threats of violence, there is the need to significantly increase presence of the police to protect law-abiding voters on voting days in future. Where there is the presence of logistically-mobilized, professionally-minded and non-partisan police, there no justification for the use of the military as was the case in some parts of the country.

Other recommendations:

(a) National and state elections

- It is recommended that good governance in general, and specifically an end to impunity in governance and corruption, as well as reduction in poverty and creation of more jobs for the youths will go a long to minimize violence in future elections.

(b) Local government elections-

- State Independent Electoral Commissions, should be abrogated and INEC should take over their roles as recommended by the Justice Uwais' Electoral Reform Committee

- (c) Generally, mobilization, training, advocacy and civic/voter education by civil society should be aggressively undertaken to

improve the knowledge of the citizenry on civil rights and obligations